We examine whether the difference in governance structures influences the risk taking and performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. Using a sample of 52 Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 countries for the period from 2005 to 2013, we conclude that the governance structure in Islamic banks plays a crucial role in risk taking as well as financial performance that is distinct from conventional banks. Particularly, we show that the governance structure in Islamic banks allows them to take higher risks and achieve better performance because of product complexities and transaction mechanisms. However, Islamic banks maintain a higher capitalization compared to conventional banks. These results support the research on Islamic investment and risk taking. Our results add a new dimension to the governance research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for policy makers and regulators in the financial services sector.

In this paper, we use the DCC MIDAS approach to assess the validity of the wake-up call hypothesis for developed and emerging markets during the global financial crisis (GFC). We use this approach to decompose the total correlations into short- (daily) and long-run (quarterly) correlations for the period from 1999 to 2011. We then examine the transmission mechanisms by regressing the quarterly economic, financial, and behavioral variables on the quarterly DCC–MIDAS correlations. We find that country specific factors are crisis contingent transmission mechanisms for the co-movements of emerging country pairs and mixed pairs of advanced and emerging countries during the global financial crisis. However, we do not observe wake-up calls in the transmission of the crisis among advanced country pairs. The classification of the transmission mechanisms for crisis and non-crisis periods with the different country pairs has important implications for crisis management as well as for portfolio investment strategies. Thus, our findings contribute to the discussion on the role and effectiveness of the international financial architecture.

The devastation resulting from the recent global financial and Eurozone crises is immense. Most researchers commonly believe that the global financial crisis originated in the United States, and spread immediately to global financial hubs where it eventually became the Eurozone crisis. Several studies have been conducted on financial market contagion during both global and Eurozone crises; however, the issue of whether equity market contagion spreads from the United States to the world equity markets during these crises has not been addressed yet. Through using US dollar-denominated MSCI daily indices from fifty-five equity markets for the period 2003–2013, we have found evidence of contagion in developed and emerging markets during the global and Eurozone crises. We show that contagion spread from the United States to the world markets during both crises. Our regression results identify that the bank risk transfer between the United States and other countries is the key transmission channel for cross-country correlations. This study has an important policy implication for portfolio diversification between the United States and other countries during these crises.

The aim of the book is to present an in-depth critical analysis of the existing literature on market co-movement and integration and an empirical investigation with a detailed comparison between developed and emerging markets in efficiency, integration, and causality during global financial crises.

We study the informational content of dividends on three Nordic civil law markets, where other simultaneous but blurring motives for dividends may be weaker. Using aggregate data on real earnings per share and payout ratios, long time series from 1969 to 2010, and methodologies which address problems of endogeneity, non-stationarity and autocorrelation (including a vector error correction model approach), we find evidence on dividend signaling in Nordic markets. However, we also find heterogeneity in the relationship between dividends and earnings on markets similar in many respects, suggesting that even small variations in the institutional surroundings may be important for the results.

The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005-2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.

This paper examines country specific herding behavior in European liquid constituent indices for the period of 2001-2012. While we report insignificant results for the whole period, we document significant herding behavior during crises and asymmetric market conditions. Particularly, herding effect is pronounced in most continental countries during the global financial crisis and Nordic countries during the Eurozone crisis. However, PIIGS countries are the victims in both crises. Furthermore, we find evidence that the cross sectional dispersions of returns can be partly explained by the cross sectional dispersions of the other markets, with Germany having the greatest influence on the regional cross-country herding effect. Apprehensions heighten among the regulators, policy makers, and investors in the European markets for the herding behavior during volatile market conditions. 

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance on auditor quality choice by IPO companies in an emerging market setting. It seeks to identify whether efficiency or opportunism is the driving force behind the choice of auditors in Bangladeshi firms going public. We try to see whether ownership concentration in the hands of a owner-CEO wins over foreign shareholders in the contest of ensuring financial reporting quality.

Design/methodology/approach – Multivariate analysis has been carried out on all IPOs made during 1990 to 2005 whose financial statements were available. Logistic regression tool has been used to identify client's corporate governance attributes affect their choice of auditors. In total, three corporate governance attributes – CEO-Chair duality, retained ownership, and foreign equity participation – were used to test the impact of ownership structure on auditor choice.

Findings – Our findings from logistic regression suggest that CEO-Chair duality and the degree of foreign equity participation are significant determinants of auditor choice while proportion of board ownership is not. In addition, issuer size and whether the issuer is a green field operation also influence auditor choice while the length of a firm's operating history does not seem to matter. The findings support agency theory prediction that (at least one category of) principals (foreign shareholders in this case), are likely to trade-off higher monitoring costs (of hiring a higher quality auditor) with agency costs arising from asymmetric information, primarily borne by absentee owners.

Originality/value – The work is based on empirical data directly from company financial statements. It uses audited financial statements and makes objective analysis of auditor choice dynamics in a frontier market that demonstrated significant growth of IPO activity in recent years.