Local labor market conditions are strongly persistent. Using a search-and-matching model with agglomeration effects and worker and firm migration, we study the transitional dynamics of a regional economy. The model is fitted to mimic local labor market dynamics using state-level U.S. time series. Agglomeration economies generate strong persistence in the employment level response to a labor demand shock, while agglomeration diseconomies dampen the shock. The amplification of the local unemployment rate response critically depends on wage rigidity. Short-term place-based policies can help the region since they dampen the impact of the shock on the employment level.

Women are underrepresented in many prestigious positions. Could increasing the share of women in hiring committees boost the rates at which women are hired into these positions? I use a difference-in-differences design to examine the effects of a French law on academic hiring committees that required each gender to represent a share of at least 40% of members. Contrary to the objectives of the law, I show that the reform backfired and significantly lowered women's probability of being hired. Because the negative effect of the reform is concentrated in committees headed by men, this result seems driven by the reaction of men to the reform. I find little evidence that the reform affects supplyside characteristics, such as the likelihood of women applying. The results suggest that the underrepresentation of women is unlikely to be solved by simply increasing the share of women in hiring committees or interview panels.

We examine the effect of labor mobility constraints on racial wage discrimination. We show that when monopsony power is low because of relaxed labor mobility constraints, firms cannot act on their prejudice and discrimination disappears. This prediction is taken to the data by using an exogenous mobility shock on the European football labor market. The Bosman ruling lifted restrictions on European player mobility in 1995. Exploiting racial differences in a panel of top English clubs, we compare the pre- and post-Bosman ruling market. We find evidence that wage discrimination disappears only for workers whose mobility constraints have been lifted.