This book presents a groundbreaking study of the Italian philosopher and scientist, Blasius of Parma (1350-1416). For the first time in English, it presents key elements of his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics both through interpretive analysis and edited texts.The main interpretive claim is that Blasius is an early mechanical philosopher. It shows this by studying six carefully selected aspects of his physics. These six aspects are Blasius’ (1) use of mechanics (science of weights), (2) analysis of causality, (3) account of motion, (4) analysis of rarefaction and condensation, (5) view of artifacts, and (6) the use of a new analytical language in physics.Authors of the interpretive essays are Erik Åkerlund, Joël Biard, Henrik Lagerlund, and Sylvain Roudaut.

The author presents an overview of the skeptical tradition against which the work of Descartes must be understood. Specific thinkers discussed include Sextus Empiricus, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Michel Montaigne, Pierre Charron, and Al-Ghazâlî. Some attention is also paid to standard anti-skeptical replies available in Descartes’s time and place, including discussions of the work of John Buridan and Albert of Saxony.

The prevailing view of Buridan’s theory of cognition and his epistemology is that he is a kind of externalist as well as a reliabilist. This essay argues that this reading is mistaken and that Buridan instead must be seen as a semantic and epistemic internalist. The essay develops the arguments for both these views. The first part of the essay supplements an argument already made by Claude Panaccio, but the second part is a new argument for why Buridan must be seen as an epistemological internalist. The essay also compares Buridan to later empiricists such as David Hume.

After Thomas Aquinas, it became standard to divide “intentio” into first and second intentions (the distinction ultimately derives from Avicenna). Roughly, the distinction captures the intentionality of concepts like “Socrates” or “human being,” which are first intentions, versus concepts like “species” or “genus,” which are second intentions. Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) was the first to write an independent treatise on this distinction, and he also introduced and used the word “intentionaliter” in a new way, as well as attempts a definition of the notion of intentionality, perhaps the first such attempt. His treatise is called De secundis intentionibus (On Second Intentions), and can only be described as a treatise on the philosophy of mind and about the problem of intentionality. In this article, I will place Hervaeus in relation to the debate on mental content between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, and show how he has the resources to define a concept of “intentionality” as “the mark of the mental.” 

On October 13, 1438 at the University of St. Andrews, what should have been a routine faculty meeting to approve textbooks for the coming year instead (as faculty meetings are sometimes wont to do) became a sharp disagreement over the choice of logic textbook and of correct procedure. The disagreement was over whether the views of Albert the Great and Peter of Spain should be allowed to be taught, or only those of John Buridan. In practice, this should have been a routine discussion, as this amounted to little more than a reaffirmation of a previous decision (indeed one with the same wording) adopted in February 1418. The majority of the masters favored teaching Buridan’s views, and, by extension, a nominalist perspective, while a minority of the masters sought to allow the teaching of the logical views of Albert and Peter. One of them, John de Camera, asked that a public record of the majority decision be made (perhaps as a safeguard against future objections from the minority), which in turn led to John Aylmer (or Athilmer) appealing to the university as well as a second official record being taken. Finally, John de Camera asked for a public record of this appeal, claiming that it violated the 1424 assertion of Faculty self-determination. This in turn was eventually elevated to chancellor (and founder) of the University of St. Andrews, Bishop Henry Wardlaw, who in turn dispatched the Bishop of Orkney to help settle the issues raised. It was eventually decided that “the doctrines of Albert or of any other philosopher who was orthodox and free from error should for the time being be free.”

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, John Buridan (c. 1300–1361) presents his well-known rejection of final causality. The main problem he sees with it is that it requires the cause to exist before the effect. Despite this, he retains the terminology of ends. This has led to some difficulty interpreting Buridan’s view. In this article, I argue that one should not misunderstand Buridan’s terminology and think that he still retains some use or explanatory function for final causality in nature. To make this point, I look first at Buridan’s text, but then also at three thinkers who discuss Buridan’s view in detail: Albert of Saxony (d. 1390), Paul of Venice (d. 1429), and Luis Coronel (d. 1531). They all have a very clear idea of what Buridan’s view was and understand that it entails a rejection of final causality, but they also all preserve his distinctive terminology. Paul of Venice especially discusses and criticizes Buridan’s view in detail. Besides confirming my interpretation of the rejection of final causality, this study also shows that the view was extremely influential well into the sixteenth century and attributed to Buridan throughout two centuries.