In der Diskussion über die Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe in Deutschland wird Schweden häufig zum Vergleich herangezogen, allerdings ist das genaue Vorgehen weitgehend unbekannt. Der vorliegende Text stellt die Vorgehensweise bei der Verhängung und Vollstreckung von Geld- und Ersatzfreiheitsstrafen in Schweden dar und zieht den Vergleich zu Deutschland. Genau wie in Deutschland werden auch in Schweden viele Geldstrafen über Strafbefehle verhängt, dort muss der/die Verurteilte dem Strafbefehl allerdings zustimmen. Wesentliche Unterschiede zeigen sich bei den Tagessatzhöhen, die in Schweden von Gesetzes wegen deutlich niedriger sind (5 €–100 €). Die Berechnung erfolgt dort zudem nach dem Einbußeprinzip, nicht wie in Deutschland nach den Nettoeinkommensprinzip. Die Vollstreckung verhängter Geldstrafen übernimmt in Schweden nicht die Staatsanwaltschaft, sondern das Amt für Beitreibung (Kronofogden). Weiterhin werden nur dann Ersatzfreiheitsstrafen vollstreckt, wenn Zahlungsunwilligkeit vorliegt – im Jahr 2019 in 13 Fällen. Das liegt wohl v. a. an der schwedischen Haltung, die den Zweck der Geldstrafe nicht darin sieht, alle unbezahlten Geldstrafen in eine Freiheitsstrafe umzuwandeln, sondern sie im Falle von Zahlungsunfähigkeit fallen zu lassen. Kronofogden prüft zweijährlich, ob der/die Verurteilte inzwischen bezahlen kann. Ist dies nicht der Fall, so verjähren die Strafen nach 5 Jahren. Von den 2015 verhängten Geldstrafen wurden 41,4 % durch Verjährung beendet. Das zeigt den hohen Anteil zahlungsunfähiger Verurteilter. 

In the discussion on imprisonment for non-payment in Germany, Sweden is often used for comparison, although the exact Swedish procedure of fine enforcement is unknown. This text presents the procedure for imposing and enforcing fines and imprisonment for non-payment in Sweden and draws a comparison with Germany. In Sweden, as in Germany, many fines are imposed by means of penal orders. Nevertheless, there is one important difference; the sentenced person must agree to the penal order. Significant differences can be seen in the daily units, which in Sweden are much lower by law (5 €–100 €). Moreover, their calculation is based on the forfeiture principle, not on the net income principle as in Germany. The enforcement of fines in Sweden is not carried out by the public prosecutor’s office, but by the Enforcement Authority (Kronofogden). Furthermore, default imprisonment is only enforced if the sentenced person shows an unwillingness to pay – in 2019 there were 13 default imprisonment cases. This is mainly due to the Swedish attitude that the purpose of the fine is not to convert all unpaid fines into custodial sentences, but to let them pass if a person is unable to pay. Kronofogden checks every other year whether the convicted person is able to pay; if this is not the case, after a time-limit of 5 years the fine is dropped. Of all fines that were imposed in 2015, 41.4 % were terminated by the statute of limitations. This shows the high proportion of convicted persons who are unable to pay.

En grundbult i det svenska straffsystemet sedan drygt 30 år är principen om bakåtblickande proportionalitet: idén att straffets stränghet ska svara mot brottets svårhet. Principen ger ledning när det gäller hur brott och straff ska förhålla sig till varandra inom systemet. Dock verkar principen inte sätta några gränser för hur stränga systemets straff bör vara generellt sett. Somliga skulle nog mena att senare års straffrättspolitiska utveckling, med en rörelse mot allt strängare straff, bekräftar detta. I artikeln diskuteras hur ett proportionellt straffsystem — åtminstone tankemässigt — kan förankras till en viss straffnivå.

This doctoral thesis examines the concept of penalty value (Sw. straffvärde), which is central for Swedish sentencing law. It is impossible to determine the penalty for a crime without establishing a penalty value, and the penalty value is usually of essential importance for how severe the sentence will be. It is not only courts that decide upon penalty values, the legislator also contributes by giving statutory minimum and maximum penalties – i.e. ‘penalty scales’ – for crimes. The purpose of the thesis is to categorise and systematise the reasons and assumptions underlying the assessment of penalty values. Given the penalty value’s fundamental role in justifying the level of criminal repression, such an approach can be considered warranted.

Penalty value expresses the principle of retrospective proportionality – i.e. the standard that the punishment should fit the seriousness of the crime. According to a generally accepted view, this principle must be regarded as relative: to determine what is a sufficiently severe penalty, comparisons with other crimes and penalties are needed. Here, one can say that the notion of penalty value adds something by implying that it is possible to determine a specific penalty corresponding to the seriousness of a crime. Thus a penalty value can be construed as a function of two parameters: the (relative) seriousness of the crime and the (fixed) general level of punishment. At the heart of the present investigation are therefore two questions, namely: (i) what the seriousness of the crime signifies and (ii) how the forces that determine the level of punishment are to be ascertained.

With regard to the first question (i), the assessment of seriousness often coincides with an assessment of blameworthiness, i.e. how much censure the criminal act deserves. However, the thesis argues that this does not always have to be the case. Right or wrong – sometimes the legislator determines the seriousness of the crime at least in part following a purely instrumental assessment. This prospective assessment can be aimed at an alleged need to prevent crime through a more severe penalty, but also at using the penalty to communicate repudiation with regard to a certain type of offence. To put into words the result of this prospective assessment, the thesis introduces the term p-harm – as opposed to r-harm, which relates retrospectively to the blameworthiness of the act. As said, it is the legislator who makes these forward-looking considerations and occasionally gives penalty values such content. At court-level the determination of penalty values – even when it is based on factors related to p-harm – is invariably ‘norm-rational’ and retrospective.

Concerning the second question (ii), the thesis argues that the forces influencing the general level of punishment should be systematised in the form of a balance between ends and means. An established public law principle that can serve to provide this balance structure is the notion of prospective proportionality. Although this way of conceptualising the punishment level must be seen as an ideal-typical and impracticable construction, it does raise certain issues concerning the justification and purpose of punishment – which otherwise risk remaining unaddressed in a system founded on retrospective proportionality.