While recent decades have witnessed a rise in the use and forms of Global Performance Indicators (GPIs), there is little systematic evidence on their effects. In this article, we address the effects of GPIs through a specific focus on international organizations’ (IOs) reporting on state compliance with international rules. We focus on the International Labour Organization (ILO), which offers a unique case for evaluating the impact of performance indicators in the absence of enforcement. We develop an argument for why reporting by IOs should lead states to correct non-compliant behavior, and when those effects should be particularly strong. Our principal findings are three-fold. First, ILO reporting has significant and durable effects on state respect for labor rights, especially in addressing severe cases of non-compliance. Second, reporting affects state behavior quite immediately, but can also lead to improvements when repeated over longer periods of time. Third, reporting has stronger effects on improvements in labor rights when the target states are democratic and have the resource capacity to correct violations. These findings have important implications for our understanding of GPIs and the effect of IO reporting on state compliance.