Despite its growing importance in applied ethics and political theory, the concept of complicity remains theoretically fragmented. The existing dominant—Causal and Participatory—accounts fail to offer a unified explanation that applies across the full range of paradigm cases. This paper develops and defends a unified account of complicity, the Moral Explanation Complicitous Accountability (MECA) view. According to MECA, an agent is complicit when their substandard quality of will helps explain a part of the wrongness of another’s wrongdoing. This framework synthesizes insights from causal and participatory accounts while offering a deeper explanatory foundation grounded in a modified Quality of Will theory. MECA successfully addresses foundational puzzles in the literature—such as how agents can be accountable without control—and clarifies whether complicity entails blameworthiness. In doing so, MECA not only unifies the complicity literature, but reconnects it with general theories of moral responsibility.