Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one's non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen's (Synthese 55(2):191-207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification for your beliefs about the external world. Internalists and externalists agree that there is something that is epistemically good or valuable about both your actual beliefs and your beliefs in the demon scenario. Internalists claim that the epistemic property which these sets of beliefs share most intuitively should be thought of as sameness of justification. Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim, usually either by challenging the internalist intuition directly, or by arguing that there is a more plausible way to think about the epistemic property in question. Recently, both kinds of externalist objection have been raised against the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem for mentalism. The goal of this paper is to defend the argument against three prominent objections-a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn (Can J Philos 39(3):399-434, 2009) and one by Williamson (in: Timmons M, Greco J, Mele A (eds.) Rationality and the good: critical essays on the ethics and epistemology of Robert Audi, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; in: Dutant J, Dohrn D (eds.) The new evil demon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016).

According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible – where a priori is used in the narrow or traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour (1980; 1985) and Lehrer's (1990) unfamiliar faculty scenarios. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against it. In this article, I defend the argument against three prominent objections from the recent literature, and I explore what commitments the accessibilist more specifically should make.

What is the basis of epistemic justification? Internalists claim that justification has it’s basis in one’s non-factive mental states. However, not all non-factive mental states have justificatory relevance. But which do? In this paper, I answer what I call the relevance question – i.e.,  the question of which non-factive mental states can play a justification conferring role – by offering a new argument purporting to elicit intuitions supporting the claim that all and only one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer justification. The claim is then defended, on the one hand, against views that want to expand the supervenience base to confer other non-factive mental states as well, and, on the other hand, against views that want to shrink the supervenience base to cover only a proper subset of one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences. Briefly put, the paper thus argues for the conditional claim that one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are the basis of justification, assuming that epistemic internalism is true.

Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism-externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons can be found in the literature. 1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. 2) Kelly (2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this presentation I respond to Williamson and Kelly's arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn't supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.  

According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against this view. In this paper, I present an argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, I also defend the argument against three recent objections offered by Stephen Wright in a couple of recent papers. The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status – i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant.

In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access internalism also has the resources to provide plausible solutions to those problems. Second, I argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access internalism avoids. Doing so, I present a new scenario which, on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, provides intuitive support for access internalism. Moreover, I also demonstrate how preservationism, in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened.