This article looks at the end­use controls of the US and European states, the application of new technologies for tracking, controlling and deactivating arms in this area, and recent debates about arms transfers to the Middle East. States’ end­use controls are employed in the pursuit of a variety of normative, economic and strategic objectives. However, the article finds that only the US has used new technologies to improve its end­use controls and only in the pursuit of strategic objectives. The article also argues that recent arms transfers to non­state armed groups in Libya and Syria may undermine broader attempts to improve global standards in end­use controls.

This chapter examines the attempt to coordinate and harmonize the dual-use and arms export control policies of EU member states, focusing in particular on the use of EU arms embargoes and the implementation of the EU Dual-Use Regulation and the EU Common Position on Arms Export. The chapter examines the original motivations that drove and sustained this effort and gives an assessment of its impact on member states’ national policies. In doing so, the chapter pays particular attention to the dual-use and arms export control policies of Europe’s major powers (France, Germany, the United Kingdom), highlighting areas where states’ policies have been affected by EU processes of coordination and convergence, and where they remain driven by primarily national considerations. The chapter also assesses and compares the impact of these processes among a selection of smaller EU member states.

Sweden is both an appropriate and important subject of study in any comparative analysis of States’ arms export controls, largely due to the strong and conflicting pressures to which it is subject. Political actors on both the left and right of its political spectrum argue that Sweden needs to maintain an independent defence industry supported by foreign sales. What makes Sweden unusual is the level of ambition in its defence industrial strategy and the volume of arms exports compared to other economic and political indicators. During 2019, Sweden ranked 23rd in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 33rd in its military spending. However, Sweden seeks to maintain independent production capacities in a range of key areas and consistently ranks higher in terms of its arms exports. For 2015–2019 Sweden was the world’s 15th largest supplier. On the other hand, there is an almost constant national discussion about arms exports in Sweden and a sizeable majority of the public favours imposing tighter restrictions than are agreed at the international and European level. Moreover, this view is shared by mainstream political parties on both the left and right of Sweden’s political spectrum. This chapter explores how Sweden structures and implements its arms export controls in the face of these conflicting pressures. In doing so, it seeks to connect the findings of the chapter with other studies of the way Swedish political institutions seek to manage conflicting normative pressures. In particular, it draws on the work of Nils Brunson from the 1980s and his notion of ‘organised hypocrisy’.

This article provides an analysis of the process and outcome of the review and recast of the EU Dual-use Regulation which concluded in 2021. The recast was dominated by conflicts both among EU member states and between the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament about the interlinked issues of expanding the range of human rights that states should consider when implementing the Dual-use Regulation and using the instrument to expand controls on exports of ‘cyber-surveillance items’. The article argues that the process of the recast­­—and particularly which proposals were put forward and which were adopted—can be better understood if it is viewed as a competition between different constitutive and regulative norms. The article also argues that the outcome of the recast can be better understood if we apply Brunsson’s concept of ‘organized hypocrisy’ and view as a set of compromises which sought to address several competing norms. The article concludes by reflecting on the possible wider application of the ‘competing norms’ and ‘organized hypocrisy’ frameworks that it outlines for other studies of the formation and implementation of states’ national and collective export control systems.