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Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
Number of Authors: 12024 (English)In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 115-129Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The desire-satisfactionist defense of the existence of posthumous harm faces the problem of changing desires. The problem is that, in some cases where desires change before the time of their objects, the principle underlying the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm yields implausible results. In his prominent desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm, David Boonin proposes a solution to this problem. First, I argue that there are two relevantly different versions of the problem of changing desires, and that Boonin's proposed solution addresses only one of them. Second, I argue that modifying the underlying principle is a better approach to overcoming the problem of changing desires since it addresses both versions of the problem. I defend this approach against objections by showing that the problems raised are problems for the principle as a general theory of harm, not for the principle as part of the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2024. Vol. 36, no 2, p. 115-129
Keywords [en]
posthumous harm, desire satisfaction, well-being, death, non-existence
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-229367DOI: 10.1017/S0953820824000062ISI: 001217343200001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85192350912OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-229367DiVA, id: diva2:1860134
Available from: 2024-05-23 Created: 2024-05-23 Last updated: 2025-04-11Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Puzzles of Harm: Essays on Collective Action, Death, and Non-Existence
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Puzzles of Harm: Essays on Collective Action, Death, and Non-Existence
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This compilation thesis identifies and addresses four types of puzzling cases of harm involving individual agents. These types of cases are puzzling due to uncertainty, not regarding the nature of harm, but regarding its normative implications and instantiation under particular circumstances. The relevant types of cases can be divided into two broad categories. In the first category are cases in which we think individuals do harm or act wrongly on account of being involved in harm, but it is not clear what the relationship between the individual act and the harm is, or how the harm makes the act wrong. These cases arise for instance in collective impact situations, where many individual acts together bring about harmful outcomes. In the second category are cases in which it seems that individuals are harmed, but it is not clear whether or how the harm is instantiated. Puzzling cases of the second kind often arise where the alleged harm is tied to the person's coming into or going out of existence, or where birth or death separates the subject of harm from the act or event that supposedly causes it. Papers 1 and 2 each address a puzzling case of harm within the ethics of collective action, while Papers 3 and 4 each address a puzzling case of harm within the philosophy of death and non-existence.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2025. p. 15
Keywords
Harm, Collective action, Moral reasons, Oppression, Death, Non-existence, Posthumous harm, Pessimism, Suicide
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-241986 (URN)978-91-8107-238-9 (ISBN)978-91-8107-239-6 (ISBN)
Public defence
2025-06-05, Hörsal 9, hus D, Universitetsvägen 10D, Stockholm, 13:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2025-05-13 Created: 2025-04-11 Last updated: 2025-04-30Bibliographically approved

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