In this paper, I argue that an individual wrongful act that is part of the oppression of a social group is pro tanto morally worse than an otherwise morally equal act that is not part of the oppression of a social group. I do this by drawing on insights from the discussion of the problem of collective harm. In collective harm situations, where many individual acts together bring about a harmful outcome, we think that there is moral reason for each individual (not) to act. Assuming it is true that an act's being part of a collective harm situation is reason-giving, I suggest that an individual act's being part of a collective harm situation affects its normative status, i.e. that it is a worse-making feature of the act. More specifically, the idea is that there is a morally significant relationship between an individual act and the outcome in collective harm situations such that standing in this relationship is a worse-making feature of the act.

Based on proposed solutions to the problem of collective harm, I identify two accounts of the morally significant relationship between an individual act and the outcome in collective harm situations, and suggest that there is a third, normatively akin way of specifying this relationship. I then argue that a relationship of this third kind holds between oppression and individual acts that are part of it, and thus oppression is a collective harm situation in the normatively relevant sense. Hence, given that an act's being part of a collective harm situation is a worse-making feature of the act, an individual wrongful act that is part of oppression is pro tanto morally worse than an otherwise morally equal act that is not part of oppression.