Constitutional change can contribute to peace and democracy after civil war. To do so, however, the constitution must be effective, generally requiring that those changing the constitution have the authority to do so. In most states during peacetime, who has authority and the sources of authority are widely accepted: accordingly, constitutions are changed by ‘the people’s’ elected representatives, often under the rules of the existing constitution. After civil war, however, authority is frequently contested. Nevertheless, during peace processes it is often the conflict parties themselves that decide the constitution. This may be beneficial for peace, but has implications for democracy.

That other actors accept the capacity of conflict parties to change to the constitution is curious, particularly given that after civil war authority is often contested.  Democratic norms recognise that ultimate authority to change the constitution lies with ‘the people’, however in most circumstances it is difficult to see how the conflict parties alone could be reasonably taken to represent ‘the people’.  International actors are frequently engaged in peace processes, and while their role in facilitating peace agreements and constitutional change has been widely examined, the effect of international law on authority to change the constitution is under-explored. Does international law affect who has authority to change the constitution? If so, does any such influence contribute to the authority of the general public or could it (also) strengthen the authority of the conflict parties?

This dissertation responds to such questions. Comprising a legal analysis, a quantitative analysis of peace agreements in 40 peace processes, and an in-depth study of the South Sudan process drawing on field interviews, it applies a novel interdisciplinary approach integrating legal and empirical methods. The legal analysis shows that a range of legal rules may be associated with differing expectations—some that the general public decide the constitution, others that the conflict parties do so. The quantitative analysis shows that authority allocated by peace process participants when deciding a future constitutional change process often conforms to the first set of rules, while the authority exercised directly by the participants often conforms to the second. The South Sudan study shows that each set of rules may influence the behaviour of actors involved in peace processes, thereby affecting who holds authority.

The central finding of the dissertation is that international law does affect who has authority to change the constitution in peace processes after civil war, but that contrary to what may be expected, its overriding effect is to support the authority of the peace process participants, and in particular incumbent governments and organised armed groups—i.e. ‘the Generals’—to do so. Human rights and African international law on democratic governance influence the decision-making of the participants on the design of future constitutional change processes, contributing to the formal authority of the general public. However, other international legal rules influence the behaviour of domestic and international actors, contributing to the overriding factual authority of the participants. Through this and other key findings, the dissertation contributes to academic and policy debates about the role of international law in peace and constitutional change processes.