What explains the rise of radical right-wing parties in post-socialist Europe? Previous research attributes this phenomenon to the legacies of socialism, emphasizing the macro-socialization processes in education and civil society. This study introduces a novel perspective by highlighting the significance of limited interaction with the non-socialist states, proposing that such interactions could have facilitated micro-socialization processes that counteracted the regime’s indoctrination efforts. By analyzing the effect of cross-border traffic agreements between East and West Germany, it is found that areas with increased Western contact during the socialist era exhibit significantly less support for the radical right thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, employing entropy balancing to adjust for socioeconomic differences in the totalitarian period, this research demonstrates that individuals from these areas are half as likely to support the Alternative for Germany today, compared to a reweighted control group. This research offers a novel mechanism detailing how Western interactions could challenge entrenched socialist legacies, contributing significantly to the discourse on political socialization and the dynamics of political culture in post-socialist Europe.

How are experiences from socialist rule reflected in support for the former regime and ideological stances after democratization? This study examines how varied experiences under socialism—whether as regime supporters or victims of repression—continue to be linked to political behavior decades after transition. Using three decades of intergenerational panel data from the former German Democratic Republic, the findings show that repression is associated with long-term opposition to the regime’s successor party, Die Linke, while former party membership corresponds with lasting support. These experiences also relate to ideological self-placement, with distinct left-right patterns persisting based on past affiliations. Within families, the extent to which these political legacies are passed down depends on political interest, highlighting that they are not uniformly inherited. By exploring how socialist-era experiences remain embedded in post-transition political attitudes, this study underscores the role of historical experiences in shaping political behavior in new democracies.

How does authoritarian repression shape political participation after regime change? This study argues that personal or familial experiences of repression can increase electoral participation through post-traumatic growth, particularly when reinforced by democratic education. Using individual-level data from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)—where fostering democratic values has been central to post-transition education policy—and an instrumental variable based on the timing of local Stasi office establishment, I show that victims of repression are significantly more likely to vote. These patterns extend to the next generation. A cross-national analysis of 30 post-socialist countries shows that, in democracies, individuals with a family history of repression are more likely to participate electorally, especially when exposed to higher levels of democratic education during compulsory schooling. In contrast, in contemporary autocracies, repression is negatively associated with participation among direct victims. These findings underscore how the political legacy of repression depends on both personal experience and how societies remember and teach the past.

By the early 1990s, millions across Central and Eastern Europe mobilized against socialist regimes. Despite their pivotal role in democratization, little is known about the long-term political trajectories of those who participated in these movements. Using three decades of intergenerational panel data from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), I trace the partisan alignments of 1989 protest participants—over time and across generations. I find that former protesters are consistently less likely to support the successor party of the socialist regime (Die Linke) and more likely to support its historical opponent (CDU) as well as the protest-origin party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). Crucially, they do not show increased support for the far-right (AfD), despite the party’s efforts to appropriate the legacy of 1989. They also display more right-leaning orientations, higher satisfaction with democracy, and substantially less nostalgia for the GDR. Among their children, patterns of partisan alignment—particularly rejection of Die Linke and support for the CDU—are evident only when parents are politically engaged, underscoring the conditional nature of intergenerational transmission. Together, these findings show that protest participants constitute an important segment of the electorate in societies that transitioned through non-violent means and are vital to analyze for understanding political behavior in post-authoritarian settings.

How do revolutionary protests shape enduring democratic engagement? Integrating research on social movements, the biographical consequences of activism, and social trust, I argue that democratic protest is not only a moment of institutional rupture but also a school of democracy. Joining movements under authoritarianism entails a leap of faith: participants must trust that others will act. When that trust is rewarded in successful democratic movements, it endures and supports higher electoral participation decades after transition. Using an instrumental-variables design based on Stasi surveillance records and intergenerational panel data from the former German Democratic Republic, I show that participants in the 1989 revolution - particularly those mobilized in high-intensity protest areas - subsequently exhibit higher electoral turnout - and, notably, so do their children. Mediation analyses show  interpersonal trust accounts for a majority of the association. Mass mobilization, I conclude, can produce not only regime change but also a participatory citizenry capable of sustaining democracy.