The ongoing rise in CO2 emissions driven by energy-intensive industries highlights the urgent need for targeted policy interventions, with national strategies playing a crucial role in the low-carbon transition. However, the factors that shape the ambition of industrial decarbonisation policies remain poorly understood. Previous research suggests that this sector presents significant challenges for policymakers. In this study I argue that a deeper understanding of the state-industry dynamics that influence policymaking is essential to explain the variation in policy ambition across countries. By analysing the policy output of 30 OECD countries from 1990 to 2022, the findings reveal that corporatism and left-leaning governments positively influences policy output - especially in the case of hard policies. Together, the results highlight the independent roles of institutional coordination and partisan orientation in shaping industrial climate governance.

Decarbonising energy-intensive industries (EIIs) is a major challenge for EU climate governance. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the flagship instrument for industrial mitigation, but its effectiveness as a stand-alone policy tool remains contested. Drawing on policy mix theory, this article examines whether increases in ETS stringency (1) thin national policy mixes, (2) stimulate the adoption of incentive-based instruments, and (3) reduce industrial CO₂ emissions intensity. Using a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences design that treats ETS stringency as a continuously increasing dose across four successive phase transitions, it analyses policy mixes and emissions trajectories across EU member states and never-treated control countries from 1995 to 2022. The results suggest that the EU ETS, as implemented across the phases examined, has neither catalysed complementary national policy responses nor generated measurable abatement effects at the national level. No evidence is found that increasing ETS stringency stimulated the adoption of incentive-based instruments. Industrial carbon intensity trended upward rather than downward relative to control countries across most of the study period, though tentative signs of an emerging abatement effect are visible in the most recent years. There is also directional evidence of a gradual thinning of national policy instrument portfolios, though this pattern varies across phases and should be treated with caution. These findings highlight the limits of a predominantly market-based approach to industrial decarbonisation and underscore the importance of complementary national policy frameworks that can work alongside - rather than be displaced by - EU-level carbon pricing.

This chapter explores the influence of industry actors on decarbonisation policymaking. First, an introduction to the challenges of decarbonising the energy intensive industries is provided. This is followed by a discussion of the two main arguments presented in this chapter, namely that industry actors utilise different strategies to protect carbon-dependence in different political-economic systems and that organisational ties between industry and political parties protect the status quo. The first argument draws from the political economy literature and demonstrates that industry actors in corporatist states have institutionalised access to decision-making and can therefore influence policymaking through dialogue and consultation. Industry actors in pluralist states, on the other hand, rely more on political allies and public lobbying to shape policies. The second argument, which draws from the comparative climate politics literature, illustrates how the close ties between industry actors and political parties on both the left and right side of the political spectrum result in the protection of industry interests. Governments on both sides of the spectrum are found to avoid regulatory policies and provide protective measures which reinforces carbon-dependence. Lastly, the chapter discusses concrete steps which have been taken to decarbonise the energy intensive industries. On the national level, states have introduced decarbonisation roadmaps and green industrial policies to steer the sector. On the global level, international agreements have been highlighted as useful tools to guide policymakers in the decarbonisation of the energy intensive industries.

Municipal governments play an increasingly important role in climate governance, often delivering energy services through municipally owned companies. Yet relatively little is known about how political dynamics within local governments shape the environmental performance of these organisations. This article examines whether shifts in the partisan composition of municipal governments influence emissions trajectories in publicly owned energy firms. Focusing on Sweden’s electricity and district heating sector - where municipal ownership remains widespread - the study analyses a firm-level panel dataset covering 112 installations across 96 municipalities between 2011 and 2023. The analysis exploits variation in municipal governing coalitions across electoral cycles to examine whether changes in political control are associated with changes in firm-level CO₂ emissions. The results provide little evidence that either the partisan composition of municipal governments or shifts in governing coalitions systematically affect emissions trajectories. These findings contrast with existing research linking partisan politics to climate policy ambition and suggest that emissions outcomes in infrastructure-intensive sectors may be shaped more strongly by technological, organisational, and institutional constraints than by short-term political turnover. The article contributes to research on public ownership, subnational climate governance, and the political economy of decarbonisation.