Cyber deterrence is a strategy to deter attackers from conducting cyber-attacks in the first place. However, several issues exist when implementing cyber deterrence, which are identified in this paper. The findings show (1) non-existence of the deterrence strategy  (2) no doctrine or decision competence to retaliate to an adversary, (3) the armed forces have no authority to retaliate when Swedish sovereignty in Cyberspace is threatened, (4) no norms or regulations exist concerning retaliation, (5) no clear governance on using offensive cyber capabilities, and finally, (6) no credibility in its cyber deterrence posture regarding how much Sweden is willing to sacrifice to protect its electoral system, which is a Swedish national interest. Therefore, this research investigates how cyber deterrence can practically be implemented in Swedish cyber security policy. So far, researchers generally focused on the human aspect of cyber deterrence. By using the case study research strategy and utilizing the Swedish electoral system as a case, this paper examines possibilities to merge the human dimensions of cyber security with the technological dimensions. Data collection is performed through documents studies and semi-structured interviews with experts in the area to identify cyber deterrence components. Further, a mathematical approach is discussed in the paper to express the relationship between an adversary and a deterrent depicting each of the actor’s risk calculus. A result of the research work performed in this paper, the deterrence components for Swedish cyber deterrence are proposed and risk calculus is performed. Moreover, measures to increase Swedish cyber deterrence posture are proposed the practical implementation of cyber deterrence in Swedish cyber security policy in order to deter attacks on the Swedish electoral system is demonstrated.