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Don’t Blame the Code! AI Paternalism Reconsidered
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Karolinska Institutet, Sweden; Stockholm Centre for Healthcare Ethics (CHE), Sweden.ORCID iD: 0009-0003-3710-6511
Number of Authors: 12026 (English)In: Philosophy & Technology, ISSN 2210-5433, E-ISSN 2210-5441, Vol. 39, no 4, article id 200Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

AI-driven diagnostic and therapeutic systems are being rapidly integrated into clinical practice. A growing literature contends that this integration threatens patient autonomy by exposing patients to a novel form of AI paternalism. I argue that this framing is misguided on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, AI systems cannot be paternalists: their outputs lack the normative and agential standing that paternalism requires – a limitation I articulate as the is–ought gap for AI-generated output. Any paternalistic force in AI-integrated care must therefore reside in human agents, not in the systems themselves. Hence, we should not blame the code for any paternalism that patients may be subjected to in AI-integrated healthcare, but rather the human agents who purpose and develop these systems. In addition to these theoretical and conceptual concerns, there are practical worries. Casting AI integration as a case of paternalism risks framing the use of AI as prima facie objectionable and channels the debate toward a narrow, binary remedy that leans heavily on algorithmic transparency as a prerequisite for informed consent and shared decision-making. These discussions, I argue, are better served by revising our underlying conception of autonomy itself. I therefore conclude this article by arguing that replacing traditional, individualist conceptions of autonomy with a relational account better captures the distributed, socially embedded character of decision-making in AI-integrated care. This also redirects normative attention from the prevention of paternalism toward the conditions under which patient autonomy can be actively enabled and promoted.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2026. Vol. 39, no 4, article id 200
Keywords [en]
AI, Autonomy, CDSS, Healthcare, Informed consent, LLM, Paternalism, Relational autonomy
National Category
Medical Ethics Medical Informatics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-261417DOI: 10.1007/s13347-026-01213-2Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-105053758003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-261417DiVA, id: diva2:2115061
Available from: 2026-11-04 Created: 2026-11-04 Last updated: 2026-11-04Bibliographically approved

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Svensson, Ellen

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